The last name of the golden ticket creator
![the last name of the golden ticket creator the last name of the golden ticket creator](https://st3.depositphotos.com/1986885/32164/v/1600/depositphotos_321647690-stock-illustration-golden-ticket-vector-template-reward.jpg)
I'll then provide a few thoughts on mitigations. I'm going to describe each of these issues while stepping through the Kerberos authentication process. Fortunately these issues are not deal-breakers for Kerberos, but they should get your attention and hopefully are getting Microsoft's attention as well. Seeing all these issues in one diagram looks pretty ominous. Here's that same diagram with the scenario flipped, along with a fuller description of the Kerberos steps and a summary of the issues/attacks raised recently: If we make the compromised host the client, rather than the target, then we see several issues arise. However, several Kerberos weaknesses come to light when the situation gets flipped around. That works great for our IR account scenario, as well as many other scenarios where privileged accounts are reaching out to untrusted hosts. The DC then provides a non-forwardable, target-specific "ticket" to use for connecting to the remote compromised host. It allows the user authentication to take place between the trusted client and the DC. This architecture addresses the man-in-the-middle issue for our privileged accounts that are connecting to compromised hosts. In my previous article on network authentication, I presented the following diagram to show how Kerberos addresses the man-in-the-middle design weakness we face with NTLM:
![the last name of the golden ticket creator the last name of the golden ticket creator](https://image.shutterstock.com/image-vector/admission-golden-ticket-template-vector-260nw-1256600146.jpg)
We'll start with a discussion of the Kerberos architecture and see how the placement of a compromised host impacts the security of the design. As incident responders, these are issues we should definitely understand in order to "Know thy enemy". These techniques can allow for credential theft, privilege escalation, and impersonation?goals in just about any advanced attack.
#The last name of the golden ticket creator password#
Issues, or attacks, such as the "Golden Ticket", the "Silver Ticket", man-in-the-middle (MITM) password cracking, and user passwords being reset without user knowledge have all been discovered, disclosed, or advanced over the past few months. Our red-team friends have been quite busy recently dissecting Kerberos and have uncovered some pretty concerning issues along the way. Then come back later for some more Kerberos fun! If you haven't patched it yet, I suggest you skip this article for now and work that issue right away.
![the last name of the golden ticket creator the last name of the golden ticket creator](https://thumbs.dreamstime.com/z/useful-any-festival-party-cinema-event-entertainment-show-golden-ticket-template-concert-ticket-ticket-mockup-gold-starry-125944965.jpg)
MS14-068 is an outright bug which should be patched immediately. Instead we'll focus on design and implementation weaknesses that can be exploited under certain conditions. The issues discussed in this article are not directly related this bug. In short, this vulnerability allows any authenticated user to elevate their privileges to domain admin rights. The culmination was last week when Microsoft announced critical vulnerability MS14-068. It's been a rough year for Microsoft's Kerberos implementation.